

DD 150000 2020-5 1 S T R Y  
FILE Training 3

Executive Director-Comptroller  
7-D-59 Headquarters

Bill -

I've been stewing a bit about the Senior Seminar and what seemingly was a decision based only on one view. The decision is obviously contrary to moves on executive and career development etc. etc. I believe it should be reconsidered and if the CS cannot participate fully that the course be offered twice per year with whatever CS attendance can be mustered.

I asked Hugh to do a paper on this matter of a single running. The attached is a draft only just now and obviously and understandably contains much emotion. It nonetheless makes a persuasive case. While it is being further polished I believe you should read and, hopefully,

agree that the subject warrants more discussion, preferably with Hugh present this time, and reconsideration.

John W. Coffey

DD/S:JWC:lcc (8 August 1972)

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Att: Third Draft, dtd 25 July 1972, Memo for ExDir thru DD/S frm DTR subj:  
The Senior Seminar

THIRD DRAFT  
25 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : The Senior Seminar

1. I am profoundly convinced that the decision on the Senior Seminar was a mistake, on all three counts;

a. Running it once a year makes inevitable a severe decline in its quality. I cannot hold together, for one running of nine weeks, the high-performance staff which under the outstanding leadership of [redacted]

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was responsible for the conspicuous success of the first two runnings.

Instead, we shall probably have to merge the management of this course with that of the Midcareer Course and the Advanced Intelligence Seminar, at a time when you are interested in increasing the number of students (which mainly means the number of runnings) for the Midcareer Course. Management of the Senior Seminar will either have to be squeezed into a program which is already full and may need expanding, or will have to be entrusted to a scratch team haphazardly brought together for a few months each year.

The whole project thus loses its vital momentum and verve, among whatever staff we can scrape together, in OTR generally, and between OTR and the directorates in all matters of planning, support, selection of subjects and representative speakers and panels, and nomination of students. The

kind of continuity which permits us to concentrate on improving each running over the last will all but disappear. And the decision to allow only one running advertises to all potential students the directorates' lack of faith in the value of the course.

b. Increasing the number of students from 20 to 25 or even 30 will also damage the course. Not merely with respect to the physical facilities, which are just right for 20 and will be overcrowded with more, but especially with respect to the amount and kind of student participation. I question whether the directorates can provide 25 to 30 outstanding senior students all at one time, and feel that enlarging the number will lower the general average. Nearly every student who has taken the course has agreed that three outstanding reasons for its success were its small size, the high caliber of his colleagues, and the depth and energy of their participation. The individual presentations by the students themselves, followed by general discussion of their functions and problems in an all-Agency context, were considered among the most valuable features of the course; they must now become brief and superficial. Discussions with speakers from inside or outside the Agency will likewise become more diluted and diffuse.

c. January and February are the two worst months of the year —

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weather, flu bugs, [redacted] travel of out-of-town speakers to Washington, etc. All our courses suffer more handicaps during those months than at any other time—especially those with complex schedules of guest speakers.

2. When the course does for all these reasons decline in value, its opponents will be able to point out that their opposition was justified all along—though it will have been exactly that opposition which produced the decline.

3. This action raises the question whether the top management of this Agency is truly serious about training. Even more clearly, it contains grim implications for the support you can expect the directorates to devote to any kind of career planning and development which includes systematic attention to training. The directorates have over the years, with varying degrees of willingness, come to support training for their brand-new arrivals; they also support the Midcareer Course, perhaps especially because it gives each of them a forum for explaining the importance of their own work. But almost every discussion of training beyond the most elementary level seems to be based on these assumptions:

a. Our diminishing staffs are so busy getting today's job done today that we cannot possibly spare people to learn better how to do the jobs of tomorrow. In any case our people will be better equipped to handle tomorrow's jobs by sticking to their desks now.

b. It follows that if I can spare experienced people for further training, especially good people, it must mean that my component is overstaffed, and naturally I can't agree to that.

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c. It also follows that if my experienced people could profit from further training there must be something wrong with them, and every objective observer knows that isn't true. My people are already the most expert and effective to be found anywhere. (Of course I get pretty annoyed when my people aren't selected for one of the ten-month war colleges, but that's different.)

4. The first of these assumptions is harped on at endless length; the second and third are obscured in other language which adds up to "Training—who needs it?" But a fourth assumption becomes explicit in the Deputy Directors' decision on the Senior Seminar, to the effect that letting a man attend it "does not automatically mitigate [wow!] against his attendance at other senior schools." Many senior managers appear to believe that any external training for middle- and upper-level CIA people is better than any internal. In the past five years CIA components have nominated 408 people to the eleven principal senior external training programs for which selections are made by the Training Selection Board. The shortest of these programs are the Federal Executive Institute (eight weeks) and the two at the Harvard Business School (thirteen and fourteen weeks), but six of them including the war colleges and the FSI Senior Seminar run for ten months. The number actually selected during these five years was of course much smaller (186), but by nominating 408 the Agency demonstrated that that many named individuals could be spared for up to ten months. (See appendix for breakdown by year and component.)

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5. Yet with one possible exception it is simply not true that this kind of training is either more effective or more appropriate for upper-level CIA officers than what we can provide ourselves. (The one exception is the FSI Senior Seminar, to which we can send only two students per year; it does after all have ten months to accomplish the sort of thing we try to do in nine weeks.) The recent critique of the 1971-72 National War College by James R. Lilley of the Clandestine Service, in which he emphasizes that the NWC has been coasting on its reputation and prestige and needs drastic overhaul, stands in glaring contrast with the 39 critiques we have received on our Senior Seminar and the many unsolicited testimonials the students sent to their own superiors. All such critiques, external and internal, deserve much more careful study than they have received outside OTR. Negative decisions which ignore these first-hand judgments by the students themselves compel the conclusion that of all the elements of the intelligence, military, and foreign affairs community, it is CIA which takes least seriously the training of its senior people in its own fundamental concerns.

6. I would note in passing the curious insensitivity to cost which this bias in favor of outside training institutions betrays. Excluding salaries of students and staff, our Senior Seminar costs just over \$500 per man. But in FY 1973 OTR expects to pay \$252, 000 for external training managed by the Training Selection Board; again excluding salaries, this figure includes tuition of \$9, 200 for each student attending the FSI Senior Seminar; \$6, 245 in tuition, per diem, and travel for each man at the Harvard Advanced Management Program; \$3, 440 likewise for each man at the Federal Executive Institute, etc.

7. All these attitudes become especially apparent whenever a training matter is brought before the Deputy Directors assembled together. And quite understandably, since each must protect the interests of his own directorate as he sees them. Last year they spent forty minutes on what is now called the Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar—twenty in favor by me, and twenty against by all of them. This year it is our own Senior Seminar; I don't know how many minutes it took to dispose of that. At any rate, the [redacted] Conference accepted STAT our proposal for a core of courses around which to develop career planning, but the very next action was to decapitate it. Perhaps the next subject will be career planning itself; to the extent it involves any substantial commitment to mid-level and senior training, including expanded management training, the reaction will be instinctively negative. You will also encounter built-in resistance to any sizeable program for training in Information Science. ✓

8. These thoughts have been building up in me for a long time. They are fueled also by other factors, as for example the low and utterly cloutless level of almost all the fifty-odd training officers in the Agency. And the way we have obscured our growing language deficit (the fact that we are losing our most accomplished linguists faster than we are replacing them) by lowering requirements and by taking comfort in the fact that after all more people are getting some language training than used to. I write these gloomy observations not out of animus towards any individual, group, or directorate, because I know it is our crisis-oriented system which has produced this to me deplorable situation:

For twenty-five years this Agency has had to concentrate on quick reaction to each day's crisis in turn, and for nearly that long we have been so compartmented that each directorate has had to concentrate on its own internal concerns—not on improving CIA as a whole over the long range. I also know that if any significant change is to occur in preparing CIA for the future it will have to be carefully imposed from the top.

HTC  
DTR

Agency Nominees to Senior Officer Schools including Program for  
Management Development and Federal Executive Institute

1968	--	O/DCI	5
		DDI	17
		DDP	22
		DDS	39
		DDS&T	<u>8</u>
			91

1969	--	O/DCI	7
		DDI	19
		DDP	17
		DDS	30
		DDS&T	<u>12</u>
			85

1970	--	O/DCI	3
		DDI	22
		DDP	15
		DDS	39
		DDS&T	<u>14</u>
			93

1971	--	O/DCI	1
		DDI	23
		DDP	14
		DDS	31
		DDS&T	<u>9</u>
			78

1972	--	O/DCI	3
		DDI	20
		DDP	10
		DDS	20
		DDS&T	<u>8</u>
			<u>61</u>
			408

Agency Participants in Senior Officer Schools including Program for  
Management Development and Federal Executive Institute

1968	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	10	
		DDP	9	
		DDS	8	
		DDS&T	<u>7</u>	35
1969	--	O/DCI	2	
		DDI	11	
		DDP	7	
		DDS	13	
		DDS&T	<u>4</u>	37
1970	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	15	
		DDP	10	
		DDS	8	
		DDS&T	<u>3</u>	37
1971	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	12	
		DDP	9	
		DDS	11	
		DDS&T	<u>6</u>	39
1972	--	O/DCI	0	
		DDI	13	
		DDP	6	
		DDS	15	
		DDS&T	<u>4</u>	<u>38</u>
				186

Agency Nominees for Attendance at Senior Schools

Advanced Management Program, Harvard - 13 weeks, twice yearly  
Air War College - 10 months  
Armed Forces Staff College - 5 months, twice yearly  
Army War College - 10 months  
Industrial College of the Armed Forces - 10 months  
National War College - 10 months  
Naval War College - 10 months  
Program for Management Development, Harvard - 14 weeks, twice yearly

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Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy - 10 months  
Federal Executive Institute - 8 weeks, four sessions yearly

1968	--	0/DCI	5
		DDI	17
		DDP	22
		DDS	39
		DDS&T	<u>8</u>
			91

1969	--	0/DCI	7
		DDI	19
		DDP	17
		DDS	30
		DDS&T	<u>12</u>
			85

1970	--	0/DCI	3
		DDI	22
		DDP	15
		DDS	39
		DDS&T	<u>14</u>
			93

1971	--	0/DCI	1
		DDI	23
		DDP	14
		DDS	31
		DDS&T	<u>9</u>
			78

1972	--	0/DCI	3
		DDI	20
		DDP	10
		DDS	20
		DDS&T	<u>8</u>
			<u>61</u>

Agency Participants in Senior School Programs

Advanced Management Program, Harvard - 13 weeks, twice yearly  
 Air War College - 10 months  
 Armed Forces Staff College - 5 months, twice yearly  
 Army War College - 10 months  
 Industrial College of the Armed Forces - 10 months  
 National War College - 10 months  
 Naval War College - 10 months  
 Program for Management Development, Harvard - 14 weeks, twice yearly  
 [redacted] - 12 months  
 Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy - 10 months  
 Federal Executive Institute - 8 weeks, four sessions yearly

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1968	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	10	
		DDP	9	
		DDS	8	
		DDS&T	<u>7</u>	35

1969	--	O/DCI	2	
		DDI	11	
		DDP	7	
		DDS	13	
		DDS&T	<u>4</u>	37

1970	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	15	
		DDP	10	
		DDS	8	
		DDS&T	<u>3</u>	37

1971	--	O/DCI	1	
		DDI	12	
		DDP	9	
		DDS	11	
		DDS&T	<u>6</u>	39

1972	--	O/DCI	0	
		DDI	13	
		DDP	6	
		DDS	15	
		DDS&T	<u>4</u>	38

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